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A good deal of what scholarship we have on twentieth -century Mozambique 
highlights two aspects of Mozambican labor history: the international leasing of 
Mozambican labor to French and British enterprise outside Mozambique, and the 
national leasing of forced labor to state and private enterprise within Mozambique. 
In the context of southern Mozambique, the territory south of the Save River, the 
international leasing of labor was of key historical significance. The flow of volun-
teer labor from southern Mozambique to the mines, cities and fields of Natal, Cape 
Colony and the Transvaal began in the second half of the nineteenth century (Harries, 
61-76; Young, 9-11). The flow was formalized and harnessed for state convenience 
and profit by the Modus Vivendi, signed with Britain in 1901. No adequate statistics 
have been compiled on extra-legal emigration, but peripheral evidence suggests it 
was about equal to legal emigration. 1 The number of legal migrants processed by 
the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WNLA) alone ranged from a low of 
about 51,000 in the early twentieth century to a peak of 118,000 in 1975 (First, 24-
25). 
Charles van Onselen and Frederick Johnstone, among others have examined 
the role of forced labor, and more directly its component systems of contract and 
prison labor in the development of a working class in Southern Rhodesian and South 
African mining industries. Both authors demonstrate that the actual use of physical 
force for mine recruitment ended by 1910 or diminished rapidly thereafter. The 
mines were able to rely instead on what Johnstone calls "extreme extra-economic 
compulsion" in the form of contract, pass and compound systems to force peasants 
into mine contracts, and keep them there Van Onselen, in particular, emphasizes 
the use of mechanisms derived from the colonial legal systems, such as laws con-
cerning vagrancy, indebtedness or drunkenness to force Africans into labor sen-
tences (Johnstone, 193; van Onselen, 104-105; see also Wolpe). 
2 
Both authors further acknowledge the key role of Mozambican labor for the 
continued success of the mining industry's system of low-wage contract labor and 
argue convincingly that Mozambican contract labor was used by the management to 
divert supplies of labor from better paying, better equipped mines to less attractive 
mines; and to reinforce sanctions imposed by government and industry to control 
mine labor (Johnstone, 177, 193; van Onselen, 86-91). Yet Mozambicans continued 
to volunteer for mine contracts. Why? 
The explanation lies in part in what van Onselen called the "harvest of centre 
and periphery." Recent research on the peasant economy of southern Mozambique 
has shown that most peasants who owned plows, draft animals or manufactured 
building materials purchased them with mine wages, or were supplied with them 
by the colonial government of Mozambique in return for their collaboration as chiefs, 
police, or headmen in the international or national labor recruitment systems (First, 
24-25, 144-145). Most wage labor opportunities within Mozambique did not pay enough 
to allow for investment in the instruments of production. If Mozambicans wanted 
cash for bridewealth, cattle, or tools, their best wage labor opportunity was mine 
labor (Young, 9-11). 
This paper will focus on the companion to the international labor leasing sys-
tem, the national leasing of labor -- forced labor, or shibalo, as it was called in 
southern Mozambique. The system developed to curb the flow of volunteers to the 
higher-wage markets in South Africa in order to employ their labor in the lower 
wage local market. Under the shibalo system, _Mozambicans were quite literally 
rounded up and marched off to work by the police and collaborators of the powerful 
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native affairs bureaucracy. The shibalo system operated on a much smaller 
scale thm the international leasing system, but it was integral to the overall design 
to attract, introduce and support capital investment--preferably Portuguese--which 
would in turn support the state bureaucracy and insure continued Portuguese sov-
ereignty in Mozambique. 
This paper will focus on the one area of concentrated capital investment in 
southern Mozambique, the colonial city of Louren!ro Marques, today Maputo. It 
will describe certain processes and outline a tentative periodization of the impact 
of the shibalo system on the development of an African working class in the city. 
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The term peasant-worker is used here to describe persons who, through their own 
efforts, or those of their families, continued to use their. access to productive 
means in the peasant economy to support themselves and/or their immediate fam-
ilies despite the fact that they spent much of their adult lives in wage labor. The 
term is preferred to migrant, since migrant, as it has been used in the literature, 
implies the voluntary pursuit of wage labor. This cannot be assumed in the Mozam-
bican context 
Shibab in Southern Mozambique: Capitalism on the Cheap 
The shibalo system can best be understood with respect to regional labor de-
mands and the nature of capital investment in the regional economy. As van Onselen 
argues for the Southern Rhodesian mines, the nature of the capital invested and the 
production processes employed determined the willingness of the industry to offer 
competitive wages and conditions. The more speculative, less profitable mines of 
Southern Rhodesia were less willing to pay attractive wages than the more solidly 
financed and profitable Rand mines (van Onselen, 18-21). Capitalist enterprise was 
much less developed in Mozambique than in the neighboring British territories, as 
is obvious from employment statistics alone. For instance, in 1912 when there were 
over 91, 000 Mozambicans working WNLA contracts, only 5, 296 Africans (perhaps 
8, 000 at the most) were recorded as employed in the entire city of Lourenc;o 
Marques. Lourenc;o Marques was historically the major employment center in 
southern Mozambique (First, 24-25; Recenseamento, 10-13). 
Until the mid-1950s when patterns changed, most capital invested in Louren~o 
Marques was irregular state funding plowed into the port and rail network necessary 
to uphold the transit trade to South Africa, and to attract and maintain private in-
vestment. Portugal at home and in her colonies was plagued by an absence of 
national private risk capital (Sousa Ferreira, 1Jassim; Smith, 653-667). Of all pri-
vate risk capital invested in Lourenc;o Marques by 1894, for example, only 27 per-
cent was Portuguese (0 Futuro, 22 November 1894). In fact, most basic facilities 
were originally undertaken on a concession basis by foreign capital since Portu-
guese state and private capital were lacking. The city's original electrical system, 
trolley system, and first modern wharf complex were all undertaken by foreign 
concession, many with direct links to mining syndicates in South Africa. 3 
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Private Portuguese enterprise developed only with substantial government 
assistance: specifically, government contracts for construction, supplies and ser-
vices, monopoly protection, and generous supplies of cheap shibalo labor. 4 Most 
Portuguese, however, remained as bureaucrats or merchants in the secure and 
profitable rum or wine trade. The limited processing industries which developed 
were primarily undertaken by British Indians. Plantation agriculture was also pri-
marily in foreign hands. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the colonial economy of southern Mozam -
biq1Ue was dependent upon low profit agricultural products produced and gathered 
by both peasant and capitalist agriculture, and upon the transit traffic which again 
handled low profit products: Witbank coal, timber, and bulky mine supplies. All 
sectors of the economy were characterized by low mechanization and labor-intensive 
technology. Given the nature of capital investment and production processes, neither 
state nor private capital in southern Mozambique was willing to offer wages compe-
titive with the Rand mines. 
The colonial state was compensated to some extent for the upward pressure 
on wages due to competition from the mines. State revenues which accrued from 
the international labor leasing system were substantial. Foreign exchange earned 
on a per capita basis for each miner or laborer leased, and transit quotas for the 
Lourenc,o Marques railway negotiated as part of the overall labor brokerage scheme, 
directly accounted for an important proportion of colonial revenue. Income from 
hut tax, commercial and customs taxes similarly reflected the earnings of inter-
nationally leased labor. However, the draw of more attractive wages and con-
ditions in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Natal plagued state and private efforts 
to develop plantation agriculture, transport systems, and tourism within Mozam -
bique not only by encouraging upward pressure on local wages, but also by encour-
aging desertion to the South African labor markets. 
The shibalo system evolved through state efforts to resolve the conflict be-
tween potential revenue from labor brokerage abroad and the desire to stimulate 
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capital investment within Mozambique. The Department of Native Affairs and 
Emigration was created in 1903 to oversee both systems. Much of the Department's 
early activity was devoted to breaking up private recruitment networks, and mono-
polizing recruitment profits in order to support the costs of curbing desertion, 
registering labor and developing a Native Affairs police force (Rela!,a'.o, unpaged). 
From the earliest efforts to mobilize large numbers of Africans for port and 
rail construction in 1889, desertions to South Africa raised the cost of wage labor 
in Louren,;,o Marques. These costs, however, were due to high supply costs rather 
than high wages. For example, in 1889, of the 250 shibalos recruited in Inhambane 
by private recruitors for the Department of Public Works (DPW), and the private 
railway contractor, 180 deserted within three weeks. Recruitors received 11$700 
reis for each recruit contracted, while wages amounted to only $225 reis per day 
per worker. The desertion therefore added costs equivalent to 9, 360 days wages. 
Recruitment costs contributed to the tendency to hold wages down, which in turn 
discouraged volunteer labor, and reinforced the reliance on shibalo supplies 
(Districto de Lourenc;o Marques, 17 August IB89). 
Shibalo, in fact, drove out ·vdunteer labor even where relatively attractive 
wages prevailed. In 1882, a Louren,;,o Marques editorial complained that volunteer 
labor had been sufficient in town until the government ordered that any drunken 
African should be seized for one to two months of forced labor, at which time vol-
unteer supplies dried up (Tornal das Colonias, 23 December 1882). Volunteers, 
the editorial charged, had turned from the arbitrary abuse of the Louren,;,o Marques 
market to the mines; this complaint was echoed chronically in the press of 
Louren,;,o Marques right up to the mid-1950s when changing patterns of capital 
investment in southern Mozambique encouraged changes in labor relations. 
The Native Affairs Department made its first attempt to control labor sup-
plies to the city with the registration law of 1904, but the move was premature. 
Lourenc;o Marques was a city with diverse groups competing for labor. Private 
commerce, construction, state transport industry and private homes all had 
different needs in terms of skill, numbers, tenure and reliability of employees. 
The government might legislate $500 reis per day as the maximum wage for an 
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African and six months as the minimum contract, but in 1904 it did not have the 
power to prevent private forwarding companies from paying twice the maximum 
wage to get sufficient labor to turn over a ship, nor was the police force and reg-
istration system sufficiently developed to curb desertion or enforce penal sanctions 
for breach of contract (Jornal das Colonias, 22 October 1904). 
The African labor force of the city was as diverse as the groups competing 
for their labor. An investigation of the impact of shibalo on the development of an 
African working class in a port city where women, children, youths, men, and 
elderly persons of both sexes competed for wage labor, entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities, and skill acquisition is somewhat less tidy than an investigation of adult 
male contract labor in a single industry organized by compounds and contracts. 
Instead of a rather streamlined supply system with labor flows running from re-
cruitment center to border to compound and returning along the same lines, what 
we find in Lourenc;o Marques and the urban hinterland is a system resembling an 
irrigation maze with various wage labor, entrepreneurial and professional oppor-
tunities capped and the flow of labor diverted to suit the demands of state and 
private capital for cheap, abundant labor. Contemporaneous with the development 
of the maze created by the demands of state and private capital was the develop-
ment of the maze created by the African population reflecting their individual 
and community strategies to advance their own aspirations for prosperity, 
security and strength. Ethnic groups had distinct information networks. Similar 
chains of information and opportunity developed aroun,d the workplace and the 
place of worship. The range of salaries, skills and work conditions for Africans 
was almost as broad as the range which divided African from European workers. 5 
Yet, even within this more diverse and less controlled situation, the 
Portuguese colonial state was able to employ shibalo labor in much the same way 
the mining industry employed contract labor. Shibalo labor, in the urban context, 
tended to hold down wages, to compromise organizational efforts by local workers, 
to divert supplies of labor from better paying, more attractive jobs to less 
attractive ones, and to reinforce sanctions imposed by government and private 
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c~ital to control urban labor. Mozambique continued to rely on force, since 
market mechanisms remained weak and the pull of stronger markets in neighboring 
countries remained strong. 
Pillaging the Peasantry: 1877 to 1929 
This period saw the first sustained efforts by the Portuguese to establish 
control over Mozambique's labor resources and to direct their energy into the im-
plantation of state and private capitalist enterprise. The government sought cheap 
labor and cheap skills; the Mozambican peasantry would provide the cheap 
labor and the African and Indian population of Lourenc;o Marques would provide 
cheap skills. This was also a period of severe political irresolution, and there 
was such rapid turnover in administrative personnel that gross corruption within 
the bureaucracy and abuses by private enterprise went largely unchecked (Silva 
Cunha, 198). 
In the urban area bureaucratic abuses were outstanding. Shibalo laborers 
recruited by force from the rural peasantry were distributed to functionaries or 
private parties through patronage networks as though the shibalo workers were the 
personal property of the patron. 6 Wages went unpaid; workers who had completed 
a contract were not allowed to return home; workers who had been told there was 
no work when they volunteered at the port in the morning were rounded up at noon 
as vagrants and put to work as shibalos on the roads. Peri-urban taverns run by 
Portuguese, Greek and Chinese merchants selling cheap wine to Africans generated 
an abundant supply of drunken Africans who were duly sobered up with a term of 
prison labor. 
During this early period labor conditions were the worst and many peasants 
experienced their first encounters with forced labor without the benefit of advice 
from their more experienced kin, which is to say that intelligence networks amot1g 
the peasant-workers were still largely undeveloped. Peasant roundups for forced 
labor and World War I military service encouraged legal and clandestine emigration 
to South Africa, and in combination with the Spanish flu of 1918, the devastation 
of the alcohol trade and widespread abuse of shibalo and volunteer labor, contri-
buted to an actual depopulation of large areas of southern Mozambique. Between 
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1908 and 1923 the population of Inhambane district declined from 415,348 to 
198,055 (Boletin Economica e Estatistica - Serie Especial, No. 6, 1929). Even 
allowing for the vagaries of colonial statistics, there is substantial supporting evi -
dence that the labor force during this period was indeed being depleted. 8 
Informants stressed that the insecurity of those times turned Mozambican 
labor against Portuguese enterprise. The British firms in Louren,;o Marques were 
generally well supplied with volunteer labor, informants recalled, because where 
there was a job to be done the British firms would put out the word that work was 
available, at a certain wage for a certain job, and all interested laborers should 
gather at the market to sign up. When the Portuguese had a job, they arranged a 
rusga--a round-up-- the day before, and all Africans whose employers did not com, 
to the police station to pick them up would be considered vagrants, and as such, 
volunteers for the job (0 Distrito de Louren,;:o Marques 12 & 24 January 1905; Nhaca, 
11 October 1977; S. Tembe, 7 June 1977; Serra Ventosa, 7 June 1977). 
The shibalo system not only alier1ated labor from Portuguese enterprise, but 
also functioned in the urban context to hold down wages and keep fringe benefits to 
a minimum for all workers, regardless of employer, by weakening the market posi -
tion of local working persons. Shibalos were most often non-local workers who 
worked ir1 controlled circumstances, often isolated from the local African population. 
The state replaced volunteer workers with shibalo contingents in order to bring 
down wages in key industries durying key periods. For example in 1910, twelve 
hundred shibalo laborers were brought it1 from Inhambane to the Louren,;o Marques 
port complex -with the stated intention of bringing down the cost of casual port labor, 
a tactic which was employed again it1 1919 (SNI, 3 May 1910, box 237; Delagoa Direc-
tory, 1910; 0 Africano, 18 March 1914). 
The tactic of replacing more expensive volunteer labor directly with cheaper 
shibalo labor played a key role in periods of falling real wages, such as the period 
from World War I to 1921. Former port workers who refused to volunteer for the 
devalued wages were rounded up and distributed to various sections of the port, 
including private forwarding companies. Labor costs were further decreased by 
employing women in the timber yards at half the wage mer1 earned, and up to 1914 
or 1915, by employing children in the coaling yards at women's wages. 9 
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Toe local African population, migrants, and shibalo workers all struggled, in the 
face of strong police and military coercion, to advance their own interests. Many 
strategies emerged, but the case of the Mchope sanitation workers is an example 
of accommodation which is perhaps exceptional, at least in southern Mozambique. 
My research here is still incomplete, but at this stage, it seems from city archives, 
oral collections and published ethnographic material that it became clear in the 
early years of city sanitation work that the Mchopes were the one group who neith €r 
died nor deserted while working shibalo sanitation brigades. Mchopes then became 
the preferred shibalo for sanitation, and as a group they were able to shape the 
situation to their advantage. 
Beginning in 1908 city sanitation was undertaken on a contract basis by a 
Portuguese firm which handled numerous state activities and received large sup-
plies of shibalo labor in the process. Toe firm could, however, be fined if sani-
tation work was carelessly or improperly handled. Mchope workers soon realized 
that they could create a costly mess for the contractor. Indeed sanitation contrac-
tors were heavily fined during the first few years for sloppy work. 10 It seems that 
a compromise was reached. 
Toe sanitation workers devised a task-oriented system, working quickly in 
order to have longer leisure hours. During their leisure time they took on odd jobs 
as gardeners, made baskets and hand crafts to sell, and by the 1930s and 1940s 
reworked trash from wealthier residential areas and industrial areas into market-
able products. Officials winked at the workers' technically illegal subsidy to sani-
tation wages as part of the unspoken bargain. Some Mchopes also worked out a 
system of tips, taking particular care with the slop buckets and trash cans of 
homeowners who showed proper appreciation and managing to overturn the buckets 
of uncooperative patrons. Toe Mchopes were able to lobby successfully for their 
own interests. Toe accommodation was seemingly facilitated by the exclusivity of 
the job--no other ethnic group would do it. Toe single outstanding exception to 
force as the base for shibalo recruitment was Mchope sanitation work, where 
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workers volunteered and many returned year after year on contract. 
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The same conditions of early capitalism in Louren'io Marques which called 
for cheap muscle from the peasantry also called for cheap skills--a phenomenon 
which brought about a quite different scenario. The pillaging of the peasantry was 
largely a result of the quest for cheap muscle. The quest for cheap··• skills, 
while compromising many local artisans, provided opportunities for African work-
men or mission-educated Africans with a long history of contact with the European 
population. These people were able to use their skills not only in comprador posi -
tions such as headmen, labor overseers and interpreters, but also as skilled and 
semi -skilled labor in positions which later became the preserve of white labor. 
Wage differentials between cheap muscle and cheap skill were substantial. In 
1909, for example, a skilled African woodcutter could earn between 1$000 and 
1$600 reis per day, and an African carpenter in the first decade of the twentieth 
century could earn 2$000 to 3$000 reis per day. A shibalo worker in the same period 
earned between $200 and $300 reis per day (SNI, box 104; 0 Progresso, 14 April 
1904; O Africano, 23 December 1909). Some Africans and Afro-European children 
of European officials and traders filled important positions in the bureaucracy. By 
1912, the city still depended primarily on African, Chinese and British Indian 
skills (Recenseamento, 10-13). The influx of white Portuguese during the Repub-
lican years, however, severely undercut the gains of the locally educated African 
and Afro-European population. Realignment of bureaucratic patronage networks 
at the time favored imported Metropolitan whites over experienced local patrons 
and their African and Afro- European clients. This was facilitated by the fact that 
local clients were formerly paid on par with Europeans so costs were the same. 
Patronge preference turned the balance and experienced locals were replaced by 
inexperienced immigrants, all of which facilitated the moves by white labor to 
solidify their gains over blacks. As the saying went, " ... The eternal [character-
istic] of our government, whatever its colour may be, is to arrange jobs for men 
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and not men for Jobs. " 
African mobility, particularly in civil service positions, was effectively 
curbed. Africans trained on the job remained perpetually in the position of native 
assistant or apprentice despite the fact that they did skilled work which their 
European superioa:s simply signed. African trainees and apprentices were, until 
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the mid-1950s, used as cheap labor and seldanpromoted (0 Africano, 18 May and 
8 June 1918; Brado Africano, 26 April 1919; R. Tembe, da Costa, de Brito, 27 June 
1977; Chibindji, 16 June 1977; Santos Tembe, 18 June 1977; Comiche, J. Cossa, 
18 June 1977). Pay differentials in 1906 between black and white carpenters were 
approximately three to one in favor of whites. By 1960 the difference was five, six, 
or as much as thirteen to one depending upon the skill. 
African skills were futher devalued during this early period through the shi -
balo process. The African press is full of complaints of state and private construe-
. tion rounding up African artisans for use as shibalos on their projects rather than 
hiring their skills. Military conscription is a further example of the forced acqui-
sition of cheap African skilled labor. Lourens;o Marques 's local African population 
was particularly subject to such practices. Educational and training opportunities 
for Africans were greater in the Lourenc,o Marques area and the population was 
consequently more skilled and better educated than the rural population. There 
were problems with exemptions for educated Africans. Statistics for the early 
years are still being processed, but for the years 1937 to 1955, for example, re-
cruits from the city provided only 6 percent of all military recruits, but 72 per-
cent of all Lourenc,o Marques recruits were skilled laborers. This stands in sharp 
contrast to most other southern Mozambican recruitment districts. Chibuto, typical 
of other districts, provided 22 percent of all recruits, but 80 percent of all Chibuto 
recruits were unskilled. 13 
During the Republican years there was increasing political pressure on state 
and private capital to employ white skills over cheaper black and Asian labor as 
the white population grew. In this area the shibalo system compromised all skilled 
labor, whether black, brown, or white. Labor-intensive, low-skill technology 
continued to take precedence over capital-intensive, skilled labor methods. The 
Maxaquene landfill project, the last of the major earthworks which gave Lourenc,o 
Marques its present topography, is a good example. The project involved construc-
tion of a seawall, extensive grading and drainage work. Portuguese artisans mounted 
a strong lobby to insure that the contract would go to a firm which planned to con-
struct a reinforced concrete wall and make maximum use of skilled masons. The 
contract ultimately went to a coalition of Portuguese contractors who relied 
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instead on large supplies of shibalo labor and prisoners who proceeded to break 
rocks with pick and shovel, carry boulders, and shovel sand. Work conditions at 
the construction site and at the coalition's quarries, which supplied fill for the pro-
ject, were severely criticized for the reported high incidence of accidents and 
deaths among African workers, but efforts to investigate the charges were frus-
trated allegedly due to the considerable political clout of the contractors (0 Pro-
gresso, 3 March & 20 May 1904; CMLM log 185, 5 February 1918 through 30 
March 1918). 
In summary this was the period of early capital investment when risks were 
highest and forced labor suffered most. There were few attempts to provide sani-
tary housing or medical care. Accident insurance was unknown for black labor and 
barely implemented for white labor. The abuses of government were as serious as 
those of private employers. Indeed, a Portuguese physician reporting on the out-
break of plague in Louren'io Marques in 1908 rese.rved his harshest criticism for 
the government itself and in particular the pigsty it considered housing for the 
public works shibalo (Relatorios & Informafoes, 177). 
The central contradiction of shibalo labor became clear in this period. Shi-
balo forced peasants into wage labor, and in so doing compromised their invest-
ment in the peasant economy, while simultaneously reinforcing their dependence 
on the peasant economy by tailoring African wage labor opportunities to temporary, 
poorly paid work, dead-end jobs which were neither designed nor" intended to 
generate or support a true proletariat. Those who had insufficient or marginal land 
had only the capitalist economy to turn to for a livelihoQd. Shibalo cut away viable 
labor opportunities from below, just as the color bar cut them away from above. The 
result was beginning to appear by the end of this period: a marginal and scrapping 
working- class. 
The Shibalo System and Sweated Labor: 1927 to 1953 
In about 1927 these patterns began to change. The administration stabilized 
under Salazar's New State. Bureaucratic corruption and supplies of shibalo to pri-
vate interests on a patronage basis were curbed. However, the state use of forced 
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labor was in fact expanded and regularized during this period. The colonial govern-
ment made efforts to enforce minimum labor conditions, insure wage payment, . 
proper transportation, and repatriation, arrd to eliminate indiscipline particularly 
at the local level of the native affairs bureaucracy. Henceforth shibalo labor would 
be distributed to private enterprise as a form of government patronage as opposed 
to indi victual patronage for pti vate profit. 14 
The insecurity of the early period diminished somewhat. Families no longer 
sent a small boy along with the shibalo captive to help him supplement his rations 
and insure his survival (Falecha, 7 July 1977; Muianga, 4 July 1977). However, the 
system was still despised, and if possible avoided because of the ridiculously low 
wages. 15 The pattern of emigration continued to be fueled by the desire to avoid 
working shibalo. By 1927 most shibalo workers were paid, though corruption did 
continue and women were still used, without pay, to cultivate an admirristrator's 
garden or clear a road. The majority of shibalo workers, however, received most 
of the stipulated shibalo wage. 
Informants nevertheless consistently referred to shibalo as labor de gras;a--
unpaid labor--insisting that the amount was so small as to be an affrorrt. Comrade 
Saul Tembe, an informant who was introduced to forced labor gathering hay for 
zoo animals at age twelve, explained to me why he spent most of his adult life 
working in the Natal sugar industry on a governmerrt passport, or lacking that, as 
a clandestirre migrant: 
Here [in Mozambique] we were forced to work for nothing. After 
a person has worked for nothing he does not want to stay here. 
Many people fled to the neighboring countries. Here work was 
for nothing, wages were the palmatorio and corn flour (S. Tembe, 
7 & 9 June 1977). 
The Salazar regime's approach to port labor in Louren¥o Marques was typical 
of labor relations in this period. Since 1906 the state had controlled raiLyard labor, 
but until 1929, wharf labor and stevedoring labor were employed by private for-
warding companies outside direct government control. The regime of the private 
forwarding firms was becoming troUblesome due to the upward pressure their 
wages placed on the state-controlled sections of the port. The takeover was at 
first welcomed by the skilled and semi-skilled Mozambican workers since they 
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hoped the takeover would mean more widespread use of the Portuguese language 
and thus allow them to assume the better positions formerly occupied by English-
speaking Mauritians and Natal Africans. Their hopes were soon dashed when the 
government placed white Portuguese in these positions, thus effectively capping 
black upward mobility (R. Tembe and da Costa, 16 June, 5 July, 24-25 August 1977). 
The state then proceeded to displace some 4, 000 casual port workers by 
bringing in an additional 1, 500 shibalo laborers who would work the wharves in 
around-the-clock shifts (Brado Africano, 19 January 1929). The situation was 
further exacerbated in 1933 when the government cut wages for volunteer port labor, 
black and white, from 10 to 30 percent. Most African dockworkers had their pay 
cut from 12$50 escudos to 12$00 escudos a day. When they refused to work at the 
lower wage they were locked up in the fenced off port area by police until all 
boats in the channel were unloaded by shibalo workers or volunteers who could be 
intimidated into working. When the boats were empty the volunteers were simply 
allowed to leave. It was clear that more shibalo workers oould be brought in to un-
load the next boats. Casual laborers had little choice but to return to work, since 
by staying away they risked arrest as 'vagrants, and as vagrants they would soon 
be unloading the next boats as shibalo labor at 6$00 escudos a day rather than their 
reduced 12$00. It is no coincidence, however, that there was serious black rioting 
through the white residential areas the following New Year's Eve under the shelter 
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of merrymaking. 
Most port workers chose to remain as casual labor and tried to make up their 
loss through overtime work. The cost of overtime in terms of worker health and 
safety was evident in the testimony of Comrade Roberto Tembe, a tally clerk at 
the port since 1927. Tembe stressed the dangers involved in trying to catch a 
few hours rest. He said that men worked themselves to death, or died as a result 
of being crushed when the locomotive under which they were hiding in order to 
rest without risk of being caught off the work site (and forfeiting their pay) started 
up without warning. 
When there was work to do you all worked until you dropped, 
because if you. did not there was someone to take your place .... 
The administrator would say, "If you don't like it, get out: 
We can get two more busfulls in Ximpamanine [the African 
marketplace J" (R. Tembe, 5 July 1977). 
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At the port the difference between casual and shibalo labor involved more 
than wages. Shibalo workers also had some incentive to work overtime and to time 
bargain since they would receive overtime pay at volunteer rates, but they risked 
nothing by leaving the workslte when their shift was over. Ironically, their rela-
tive job security as contract shibalo allowed them a measure of privilege. They 
could, and regularly did, refuse heavy work. African foremen organized tasks so 
that the most difficult jobs fell to volunteers who received a higher cash wage. 
The foreman's expectations of shibalo labor were lower (Comiche and Cossa, 18 
June 1977). 
Closet Shibalo: 1953 to 1962 
From about 1953 to 1962, changing patterns of capital investment brought 
about changes in the labor economy. The colonial government embarked on a series 
of six-year development plans involving a good deal of construction and investment 
in an expanded transit trade. At about the same time insurance companies, mutual 
savings institutes, and banks, which had managed to accumulate capital in the first 
twenty years of the New State, began to advance capital for investment in housing, 
commercial construction, and the tourist industry. The period also saw the develop-
ment of some secondary industry. This new capital brought with it a slow and 
halting expansion of volunteer labor opportunities for Africans. 17 Up to the early 
1950s shibalo and prison labor had been the backbone of the city's construction 
industry, but now it became politically unacceptable and economically unnecessary. 
Men like Comrade Saul Tembe could return from the sugar fields and find work 
in city construction. 
Shibalo labor did not disappear completely; despite Portuguese posturing to 
the contrary, shibalo was still widely employed in rural areas, and in the city it 
discreetly fulfilled three of its historical functions: political patronage in the form 
of a subsidy to petty Portuguese capitalism, as a core labor pool at the port, and 
as a sanction to insure worker discipline. 18 Shibalo continued to be used to satisfy 
the supporters of the regime. For example, when a group such as the Inda-
Portuguese Association, the Naval Club, or the Sporting Club of Lourenc,o Marques 
needed a small crew of laborers to tend their tennis courts, clear their grass 
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or the like, they simply asked the Curator of Native Affairs for laborers, and they 
received them. 19 Small groups of shibalo continued to be supplied to low-profit 
small industries (most often run by old colonists) as a subsidy to petty capitalism. 
By the early 1960s, for example, these workers were most often distributed to 
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suburban supporters of the regime. 
Shibalo continued to function as the core group at the port, thereby under-
mining any attempts by port labor to disrupt the flow of the key transit traffic. And 
finally, shibalo continued to function as a common sanction employed by the power-
ful native affairs department. For example, volunteer stevedores caught in an 
attempt to alter their pay tickets in 1955 were all sentenced to three months of 
shibalo at the port. Those suspected as the leaders of the plot, however, were 
sent off to Sao Tom~ for nine years. 21 Ti rre and time again, when informants were 
asked about strikes and work stoppages, they stressed the futility of it all, saying, 
"There was always shibalo'." The answer to resistance was, "Send him off to 
shibalo'." Shibalo was despised even more than the dreaded palmat6rio, because 
its humiliation and pain were longer lived. 
Emigration to the labor markets of southern Africa was clearly the most 
common strategy devised by rural peasants and Lourenc;,o Marques workers to 
avoid shibalo and earn a wage which allowed them a margin of prosperity. An 
alternative strategy for migran.ts coming to Lourens,:o Marques was to work out 
a deal, usually with an Indian shopkeeper or working-class Portuguese to register 
as their house or shop servant in exchange for a small fee. The bogus registration 
provided the necessary cover to remain in the urban area, avoiding forced labor 
for vagrancy while earning a living from so-called clandestine activities. These 
activities ranged from seasonal marketing of beverages brewed from cashew nuts 
or other local praLucts, to unlicensed entrepreneurial activity of all sorts. The 
licensing system was the major barrier to petty trade and service activity which 
might compete with white enterprise, but even here shibalo labor was used in 
various ways to undercut African occupation in any area outside the category of 
cheap manual labor (ACLM licensing and registration files, 1937-1951). 
For example, by the late nineteenth century African men and women handled 
most of the white city's laundry (Monteiro, 16). Migrant males were often able 
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to handle a larger volume than local females, since the men often depended upon 
female kin to do the actual washing while they handled the pickup, distribution, 
and collection of fees. Laundry work was one of the few legal occupations which 
provided an independent living. In 1933 a shibalo policy change undercut the mar-
ket of those laundry people who formerly depended on the large Portuguese working 
class settled around the Sa'o Jose Mission for their business. Under the New State 
it was no longer acceptable for local African women prisoners (usually arrested 
for prostitution, drunkenness, or the clandestine sale of brewed or distilled drinks) 
to be employed on roadwork in the city streets, so these women were sent to the 
Sao Jose' Mission and put to work doing laundry at reduced rates for the local 
white population (0 Evangelo, 26 August 1933). 
The shibalo system in cooperation with the licensing system funneled cheap 
labor to Portuguese entrepreneurs, thus adding subsidized labor to the other advan-
tages white entrepreneurs enjoyed, such as monopoly concessions and subsidized 
transport. The charcoal and firewood business, for example, was temporarily 
removed from African hands only to return to African control after the white city 
was so well served with electricity and gas that the Portuguese concession-holders 
chose to move on to more profitable enterprise. 
Patronage, Solidarity and Shibalo 
An African proletariat did develop in Louren,;:o Marques, but it was a rela-
tively small and marginal group that often depended upon the wages of all family 
members, or a subsidy from male kin in the mines in order to accumulate capital 
for bridewealth or education. Only a tiny group of old local African families, whose 
members were among the most educated Africans in the country, lived in relative 
prosperity from their skills, their professions, or their rents. The shibalo system 
compromised their prosperity as well by holding overall African wages so low that 
the local African consumer market upon which this group cjepended remained rela-
tively weak. It was only at the begin_ning of the armed s.truggle thalt wage increases 
in Mozambique, in combination with wage increases at the mines, [ generated 
an increase in African consumer power, thus strengthening the sales and service 
potential of the local market. This period was marked by the rapid proliferation 
of so-called clandestine markets and enterprise in the peri -urban area to serve 
the newly-invigorated African consumer market. 
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Shibalo labor throughout the colonial period was generated and distributed 
through profitable patron-client networks, The local African petit bourgeoisie, the 
marginal working class, peasant-workers, and shibalo workers all fitted quite 
differently into these networks, despite being clearly interrelated. Patronage and 
paternalism confused class issues and undermined efforts toward racial or class 
solidarity. The African bourgeoisie of Lourenc;:o Marques--os grandes, the big men--
were more than a class apart from the shibalo workers. The big men called for 
black solidarity in the face of color barriers and injustice suffered by all blacks. 
They thouglt of themselves as the patrons, _if not the natural leaders, of Mozam-
bique's black population. 22 African peasant-workers had another perspective. 
Some informants claimed, "The assimilados abandoned their mothers, their 
ancestors, even their language. They did not think we were people. "23 An attitude 
of caution mixed with disdain was typical of informants with regard to the "big men:" 
People were afraid of them. Some of the most important ones 
made good money.,. Help us out? Huh; When you looked at them 
you were looking at the bossman. Help us out? Oh, they might let 
you do a job for them ••• but they did not speak to us. They only 
spoke to the whites--people didn't count for anything with them 
(Macaneo, 5 July 1977). 
A smaller proportion of informants, while demonstrating their disapproval of the 
assimilation myth, spoke sympathetically of those who were able to use that system 
for the benefit of themselves and their families. They saw no glory in suffering, and 
a measure of humiliation was accepted if the end result was a chance for a living 
wage or an education for one's children. 
Solidarity based on paternalism, howe·re r, clearly had its weaknesses. The 
case of Afro-Portuguese Joao dos Santos Albasini is an important and ironic example 
of bold leadership severely compromised by cultural condescension and the lure of 
powerful patrons. Albasini 's grandfather was a celebrated nineteenth-century Portu -
guese pioneer in the trade between Lourenc;:o Marques and the Transvaal. His great-
grandmother was the queen of the Maxaquene Ronga, the largest African clan in 
the Lourenc;:o Marques area (Brado Africano, 19 August, 8 September 1922). 
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Albasini, a brilliant journalist, was an editor of the Lourern;;o Marques newspaper, 
0 Africano (later called O Brado Africano) from the paper's inception in 1908 until 
Albasini's death in 1922, The masthead proclaimed the paper to be "devoted to the 
defense of the native population of Jvbzambique." Albasini used his paper to attack 
the government's abuse of the African population, particularly the treatment of 
African labor at the port and railway where Albasini was an official forwarding 
agent- -a position he had acquired through the intervention of a white patron. 
Governor General Freire de Andrade responded sympathetically to Albasini's 
charges, and in 1913 offered him a position as overseer of African labor at the port, 
a position which Albasini accepted and held for four years at which time the position 
was dropped, allegedly for lack of funds, but coincidentally at a time when Albasini 
renewed his press criticism of Portuguese colonial labor policies (0 Africano, 3 
July 1913, 12 February 1917). 
Albasini's position on labor, however, was that, yes, idle, ignorant African 
peasants had to be forced to labor to build a more prosperous Mozambique, but the 
government should properly house, feed and transport these workers, and pay them 
when they returned to the rural areas to prevent these workers from becoming intro-
duced to urban vice. In Albasini's view the paternalistic introduction of something 
called civilization was appropriate and desirable, and a measure of sacrifice and 
24 force to insure worker discipline would be necessary. 
When Albasini died of lung disease at age forty-six, he was widely hailed in 
the colonial press as the champion of African interests, the venerable defender of 
African labor. 25 Some common workmen of Lourenc;o Marques, several of whom 
actually worked shibalo terms at the port and rails during Albasini's tenure as 
labor overseer, remembered him in quite a different light. Several charged that 
Albasini in fact "taught the Portuguese about shibalo .•. he [Albasini] earned his 
money by selling people. He would tell the government that these vagrants should 
be bought by the government for port labor, and then he received a percentage" 
(Nhaca, 11 October 1977). Many others remembered him as the black man who 
"sold" shibalo to the government. To this day the compound which formerly housed 
railway shibalo labor is called Mwanzengele, Albasini's name in the Ronga language. 
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It is surely not the memorial Albasini aspired to (Mussona, 10 October 1977; R. 
Tembe and da Costa, 24 August 1977; Kuamba, 7 July 1977), 
Albasini subscribed to the mentality which confused prosperity with capitalism 
and culture with capability. He was aware of the contradictions, but he benefitted 
from the system which successfully co-opted African leadership through patronage. 
The key to the success of the patronage system was that it exempted key Africans--
chiefs, police, educated and propertied persons---from the chains which bound 
other Africans, including the chain of shibalo labor. These exemptions produced 
"big men" who were encouraged to see themselves as distinct from "natives," 
but never as the true equal to whites. They were simply the favored sons who had 
their own parochial struggle. 
The shibalo system further exacerbated fragmentation by creating a group of 
subworkers--these were not workers, they were shibalos. They worked and lived 
apart from the urban African population. They were used to undercut all working 
class demands. They were hated and pitied. They were both the tool and the under-
pinning of state and private capital. They were the symbol of coercive control. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the shibalo system throughout the period up to 1962 functioned 
as a subsidy to state and private capitalism in Louren'io Marques. It tended to 
push peasants into wage labor, while curbing opportunities for the development 
of skilled African laborers or an African petit bourgeoisie, leaving many little 
choice but to enter unskilled manual labor or designated black service positions. 
At the same time, the system allowed African wages to remain at such low levels 
that the development of a proletariat was retarded, 
The shibalo system was used by the state to keep the working class marginal 
and exploited. The peasant workers initially created by the system comprised the 
majority of the city's labor force throughout this period. A small scrapping 
working class developed around a few protected industries, where the greater skill 
level required curbed the use of short-term shibalo workers, and in the lowest 
level of the state bureaucracy. The most prosperous Africans were from old local 
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families. Their prosperity was dependent upon their shrewd use of the education, 
property and connections whiah had accrued to them over the years. 
There was great potential for a large African working class to develop in 
Lourenc.o Marques once sustained capital investment raised African wages suf-
ficiently to allow volunteers to replace shibalo labor. Peasant-workers who found 
their families increasingly hard-pressed to subsist in the peasant economy in 
their absence would have liked to bring their families to the city on a permanent, 
rather than a seasonal basis. Indeed many did so when the wage increases of the 
late 1950s and particularly the 1960s freed them from their dependence upon 
access to means of production in the sagging peasant sector. The shibalo system 
had been employed to trap most Africans in the position of peasant-worker and 
the system was only curtailed when it suited the needs and interests of state and 
private capital. 
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NOTES 
Interview material will be noted by informant's surname and the inter-
view date. All interviews were conducted in the greater Maputo area. 
Monographs, newspapers, interviews and archival sources have been 
noted in parentheses within the text wherever ID ssible. Footnotes are 
used only where further clarification is necessary. 
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1
consul in 1955 estimated clandestine emigration in the early 1950s to have 
been about 150,000 annually, -- more than equal the number of legal emigrants 
for many years. Consul to Dept. of State [hereafter USACLM to DS] No. 151, 29 
March 1955, FIA/BU. Interview data suggest that clandestines were equal to or 
outnumbered legal emigrants in the early twentieth century when migration controls 
were less effective. 
2Each of 157 persons interviewed was questioned about shibalo labor. What 
was it? Who worked shibalo? What did they personally know about the system? The 
overwhelming majority responded that people were seized for shibalo, no one vol-
unteered. Of 51 persons interviewed at the slaughterhouse and construction depot 
alone, 22 had themselves worked shibalo, and all but five personally knew shjbalo 
workers. Two informants who worked in the personnel offices of the port stated 
that about 5, 120 shibalos were employed at the port until late 1972 (Bie, 21 June 
1977; Matusse, 16 June 1977). 
3 USACLM to DS, unnumbered 20 August 1896; USACLM to DS, No. 252, 7 
July 1902, Microcopy T-171, Rolls I and 4 respectively. 
4Tue documentation for this is profuse. Consular economic intelligence re-
ports from Great Britain and the U.S. as well as foreign and local press confirm 
the generalization. 
5
clearly an analysis of the African working class of Lourenco Marques is 
incomplete without reference to the European working class. Asi&i from statements 
about the consolidation of white advantage, the topic has been curbed to fit the 
space demands of this particular paper. 
6Tuis was a chronic complaint in the African press throughout the period. See, 
for example, Brado Africano, 17 November 1925. 
7 Correspondence quoted is from a 1947-1948 ACLM investigation, but it was 
an old custom as described in interviews, Navesse, 1 June 1977; da Costa, 16 June 
1977; R. Tembe and da Costa, 24 August 1977; Santos Tembe, 18 June 1977. 
8Medical inspection of Southern Mozambique stressing the devastation of the 
alcohol trade, 0 Futuro, 11, 14, 23 April 1908; "Relatorio de Saude," Caminho de 
Ferro de Louren 3o Marques,. 1908; 0 Futuro, 15 December 1906; 0 Africano, 14 
January 1914; Cortei<l de Mo~ambique, 14 May 1925. Rosa Cabral emphasized the 
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alcohol trade, but in connection with excess military, mine, and shibalo recruit-
ment, drought and flood between 1910 and 1918, 0 Incondicional, 21 May 1918; 
5 July 1918. 
9
sNI director Jaime Teixeira argues (Caixa 51 - Relatorio 21 May 1921) that 
real wages dropped significantly between 1914 and 1921 due to wartime inflation 
and the devaluation of Portuguese currency with respect to the pound sterling. In 
1914 the exchange was ;(l,. 5$00 escudos; by 1921 it was equal to 40$80 escudos, 
and by 1925, 109$00 escudos. Clearly Africans who generally were paid in escudos 
suffered as prices for food, housing, clothing and their taxes reflected the devalu-
ation. 
10
sanitation problems were followed through the CMLM logbooks and minutes 
of the CMLM board meetings. For examples of fines and complaints, see log No. 1248, 
5 November 1912. 
11R. Tembe and da Costa, 25 August 1977; Vicente, 12 November 1977; 
Guevende, 10 November l977. The Mchope experience seems to fit with the obser-
vation of Kenneth King for Nairobi Kikuyu tinsmiths; see his The African Artisan: 
Education and the Informal Sector in Kenya (London: Heineman, 1977), 146-147. 
12Dominions Office _to Foreign Office, 21 August 1941, enclosing undated 
letter to the editor of Noticiais, File C, 12912/541/36, FO 371, Public Record Office, 
London. 
13Figures from recruitment records for southern Mozambique, Military Census 
books, 90/75, 119/88, 167 /111, 209/131, for the years 1937 to 1955, ACLM. 
14Ross report to League of Nations and Phelps-Stokes Commission both chal-
lenged Portugal's propaganda and brought about some cosmetic as well as genuine 
reform. 
15Virtually all informants stated that shibalo wages were disgracefully low. 
16Toe work stoppage was known as the'quinhenta strike." A quinhenta was the 
nineteenth century term for 500 reis or 50 centavos, the amount deducted from the 
workers' daily wage. Cossa, 18 June 1977; R. Tembe and da Costa, 5 July 1977; 
Lourenco Marques Guardian, 29 August 1933; Brado Africano, 9 September 1933; 
; 
0 Noticiais, 28 August 1933; 0 Emancipador, 11 September 1933. For analysis of 
the rioting see Uniao, 13, 27 January 1934, and Brado Africano throughout January 
and February 1933. 
17 The annual economic reports compiled by the U.S. Consulate provide a good 
overview of the economy for the period, FIA/BU. 
18 Archival information on shibalo came from SNI records for 1903-1935 and 
ACLM for 1935-1962. From 1917 to 1935 the Commisario de Polfcia in Lourens;o 
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Marques had the legal power to summarily sentence Africans to shibalo if they were 
considered vagrant. Press and oral reports indicate this was a significant source of 
cheap labor in the city, but ten months of search in Maputo failed to uncover the 
police archives for these years. 
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Files 54/D for the 1940s and 1950s, ACLM, contain many examples of this 
kind of patronage. 
20Registo de Chibalos, 5 September 1960 (Chibalos crossed off and Desem-
pregos [unemployed] written in in perrcil). Most show terms of six morrths to fish-
ermen, scrap metal, salt flats, market gardeners of the peri -urban area. 
21Ficha 44161 registering Valente Mucozana, for example, rroted that he was 
arrested irr connectiorr with, arrd irr possessiorr of, a falsified stevedorirrg card. He 
received rrine years' deportation to s£"o Tome and sailed for that island in November 
1955. Kuamba, 7 July 1977, Comrade Kuamba was serrterrced to Sa:"o Tome irr a sep· 
arate case at the port. He worked there as a prisoner fm m 1955 to 1962. 
22
Toe editors of the press O Africano and O Br ado Africa no declared them -
selves irr the masthead to be "Dedicated to the Defense of the Interests of the Natives 
of Mozambique, "but they were outraged wherr the Europearr press referred to them 
arrd their peers who "drink tea" as "rratives. "They clearly did rrot corrsider them-
selves natives, Brado, 20 April 1935, 6 Jurre 1936. 
23 
This view is commorr in irrterview mat<1;rial. The quote here is takerr from 
J eque, 3 July 1977. 
24 Albasini's attitude was explicit in his press articles; see Brado Africarro 
of 26 April 1919, for example. 
25
see obituary notices reprirrted from various t1atiot1al ~nd interrrational 
papers in Brado Africauo, 19 August, 26 August, arrd 8 September 1922. 
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